Abstract-With the widespread development of RFID technology, security and privacy issues become more prominent in RFID applications. In this paper, a new oneway hash function based mutual authentication protocol is proposed to address such security and privacy problems. Particularly, access list and pseudorandom flags are adopted for quick search, to ensure good efficiency and scalability. The proposed protocol is analyzed according to three aspects: logic, security and performance. Concretely, GNY logic formal method is used to verify the design correctness of the protocol, the attack model is used to analyze the security, and the performance is evaluated from communication overload, storage, and computation requirement. The analysis results show that the protocol has no obvious design flaws, can resist major attacks, and improves the system reliability and effectiveness. The proposed protocol can be easily scalable for lightweight RFID systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems, thanks to their low cost and their convenience in identifying an object without physical contact, have found many applications in manufacturing, supply chain management, parking garage management, and inventory control [1] . Moreover, RFID technology is envisioned as an economical replacement for traditional barcode counterpart and expected to be massively deployed in consumer object identification. The advantages of RFID system over barcode system include many-to-many communication, wireless data transmission and its computing nature [2] .
Despite many prospective applications, RFID technology also poses several security and privacy threats [3] [4] which could harm its global adoption. Many schemes have been proposed to address those security/privacy issues. Authentication of RFID tags is an active research area and protocols have been extensively studied and reported in the literature [5] [6] . It is more common that mutual authentication of the tag, reader and back-end server [7] [8] [9] . Mutual authentication is required to ensure that tag information can only be legitimate reader and server systems to get and reader and server systems only accept legal tag information. Moreover, communication data need to be protected.
Some authentication protocols [10] [11] [12] provide security based on bitwise operation or other simple functions. Some authentication protocols [13] [14] [15] [16] mainly execute irreversible hash function and pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). Other authentication protocols [17] [18] mainly use typical cryptography to achieve high security and require more system resources. Most authentication protocols have been designed without strict formal proof. However, lack of formal analysis may make those protocols ignoring design flaws and security vulnerabilities. In many cases, people want to achieve good security and privacy guarantee, but do not want to consume too much system resources.
In this paper, we proposed a mutual authentication protocol based on one-way hash function for RFID system, which hope to meet aforementioned requirement. The main contributions of our work are as follows. Oneway hash function is used to protect communication data during authentication. Access lists and pseudorandom flags are used to achieve quick search. GNY logic formal method is used to verify the design correctness of the protocol. The attack model is used to do the security analysis.
In next section, related RFID protocols are reviewed and analyzed. The proposed protocol is described in section 3. Formal analysis of the protocol with GNY logic is given in section 4. In section 5, the attack model is used to analyze the security on the major attacks. Performance analysis is done in section 6. Finally, section 7 draws a conclusion II. RELATED WORKS According to the security efficiency and operation complexity, the protocols (including access control, authentication and encryption) can be classified into three categories: ultra-lightweight, lightweight, middleweight. The proposed protocol is a lightweight protocol. So the authors focus on some related lightweight authentication protocols.
Song and Mitchell (SM) [13] propose a RFID Authentication Protocol for Low-cost Tags which uses a random number as a temporary secret and a keyed hash function to protect the messages communicated between tag and reader. It is claimed that the scheme can provides the identified privacy and security features. But this scheme resists forward traceability and server impersonation under an assumption. And the scheme has not been proved by formal method and there may be design flaw.
Ning et al. [9] suggest a distributed key array authentication protocol (KAAP) that provides classified security protection. It is synthetically analyzed in three aspects: logic, security and performance. It is claimed that the scheme can resist both external attacks and internal forgery attacks with insignificantly increased complexity. The scheme need hold key array, once the key array is leaked, the entire system security can not be guaranteed. Moreover, the key array method limits the system scalability.
Rhee et al. [14] propose a Challenge-Response Based RFID Authentication Protocol (HIDVP). The protocol is based on Challenge-Response using one-way hash function and random number. It is claimed that the scheme can resist spoofing, replay attack and so on. But it has been found to be unsuitable for distributed database environment [8] .
Liu and Ning [8] present a zero-knowledge authentication protocol based on alternative mode in RFID systems (ZKAP). In ZKAP, dual zero-knowledge proofs are randomly chosen to provide anonymity and mutual authentication without revealing any sensitive identifiers. The scheme uses Pseudo-random flags and access lists for quick search and check. And it employs formal proof model and attack model to prove that ZKAP owns no obvious design defects and can resist major attacks. But the scheme requires too many rounds (4 or 5) and too many messages (8 or 10) need to be communicated. The conventional security scheme only need communicate 5 messages. Table 1 shows the parameters applied in the protocol. Figure 1 shows the new protocol. We describe the protocol detail in the following according to the sequence of message exchanges. 
III. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION

A. System Parameters
B. Authenticate Phase
it is false, T is considered as an illegal entity and R will terminate the authentication process with an error code. Otherwise, DB forwards T PID to R and T will be authenticated by R. Then R obtains
by performing a one-way hash function and sends R F to T. 5) Phase 5: Authenticate the reader: Upon receiving R F , T performs the one-way hash function on its current T PID and T r . If the two values are equal, R will be authenticated by T. Otherwise, R will be considered as an illegal entity and T will terminate the authentication with an error code. The proposed protocol adopts lightweight mechanisms to realize security, efficiency and reliability, including one-way hash, quick check, and mutual authentication. The main approaches are complementary as follows.
1) One-way hash is adopted to protect T PID and R PID to realize no reversibility without revealing any sensitive data. The one-way hash function has the following property: For any output y, it is computationally infeasible to find an input such that
, given no corresponding input is known [13] The access lists as index-pseudonyms effectively reduce the time complexity of search operation and enable more scalable for dynamic systems. 3) Pseudorandom identifiers are transmitted instead of the real identifiers. Furthermore, T and R generate their random numbers T r and R r which are to ensure dynamic refresh in each session. Moreover, R and T store the last Pseudorandom identifiers and random numbers, if a new query arrives with the same data within certain time, it will be neglected. This will help the system resist the replaying or jamming attacks. 4) Mutual authentication procedure is performed to realize access control. T verifies R by two steps. The first step is to ensure the validity of R PID . The second is to indeed authenticate R. DB authenticates T then transmits the message to R. If and only if both authentications succeed, communication between R and T is secure and will continue. In summary, the new protocol is a lightweight mutual authentication scheme based on one-way hash function. The mutual authentication protocol IV. FORMAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL WITH GNY LOGIC Most authentication protocols have been designed and demonstrated in informal ways. However, informal analysis may ignore design flaws and security errors. In the last section, we have been described basic security verification for the new protocol in the intuitive way. In the section, GNY Logic [19] is applied to analyze the design correctness of the new protocol. The formal method may evaluate the protocol strictly and completely therefore even subtle defects can be found. With the formal method, a protocol can be demonstrated to reasonably achieve its goals using logical postulates.
We do the GNY formal logic analysis like [9] , and the analysis comprises of four steps: 1) formalization of the messages; 2) definition of initial assumptions; 3) definition of anticipant goals; 4) verification by logical rules and formulas.
A. Formalization of Messages
We formalize of the protocol messages in the language of GNY Logic and express each exchanged message as a logical formula. For the sake of clarity, we use the same statements like [19] [20] . Table 2 shows those statements. 
B. Initial Assumptions
In order to deduce the security goals from the aforementioned statements, some assumptions are needed. We assume that the following statements can be obtained: 
C. Anticipant Goals
The aim of the protocol is to mutual authenticate between R and T and assure the messages not used in the previous sessions. The anticipant goal can be expressed as follows: 
D. Logic Verification
In this subsection, we will show that the goals can be deduced from the assumption, the formalized messages and the related GNY Rules.
From M1, T is informed messages ) , (
. T has not received or sent them in the previous sessions, we have )
L , and applying the Being-Told Rule T5: Applying the Possession Rule P1 :
From A5, R PID T # |≡ , and applying the Freshness Rule F1:
Applying the Message Interpretation Rule I3:
Finally, from I3 interpretation and applying the Message Interpretation Rule I7:
As a result, T believes that R once conveyed R PID and R r . Goal G1 and G2 are achieved. Hereinafter, for simplicity, we directly mark the applied logical rules and formulas behind the formula.
For Goal 3: 
As a result, R is entitled to believe that ) ( T PID h is fresh.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Like the majority of similar protocols, we suppose the communication between DB and the reader is secure. However, the wireless communication between the reader and the tag is confronted more serious challenges. We consider the following attack in the attack model: spoofing, replaying, tracking and DOS.
We perform the analysis with three steps like [9] . The first step is to suppose the action of the attacker and the second is to simulate the process of the attacking step by step. The last is to deduce the security.
A. Spoofing Attack
In spoofing attack, the attack forges a legal reader to get the information of the tag or forges a legal tag to cheat the reader.
During the reader spoofing attack, an attacker simulates as a reader R and performs the following actions:
In 
A: Finally, A disguises as a reader a R and forwards ) , (
, authentication fails.
B. Replay Attack
Replay attack refers to that an attacker impersonates a legal entity to involve into the communications so as to access, modify, and even delete the messages [8] . The protocol uses a random number to resist the replay attack.
In one session:
}. In the next session: A disguises as a tag a T .
, then will find that T r has been used in the former session. The protocol terminates. 
, the protocol terminates.
C. Tracking Attack
The attacker may trace tags through collecting the transferring messages in the past transmissions or through malicious readers.
In the former situation, the reader and tag generate and use different random numbers for each authentication, so the attacker can not find two same messages and is incapable of tracing the certain tag.
In the latter, some malicious readers send the same query to a tag. If the tag responses the same message, the reader may trace the certain tag and achieve its related information.
If the attacker A performs the following actions: : .Thus, the attacker is no ability to trace the certain tag according to those different messages. Therefore, no matter which way the attacker employs, it is impossible to trace certain tag and the location privacy is ensured.
D. DOS Attack
DOS attack refers to the database and readers are not able to process the normal communications, because the attacker makes sure that their resources struggling to keep up through launching a lot of requests.
The purpose of DOS attack is not to achieve the sensitive data, but rather tying to disturb the normal communication.
In this protocol, we adopt two approaches to provide protection against the DOS attack like [9] . One is access lists ( T R L L , ) for preliminary check. The database will block malicious attacks by no matching pseudorandom identifier in the access list T L and similarly R L will help the tag discern the illegal reader. Another approach is random/ pseudorandom numbers (
). The legal tag and reader store the last received random numbers and pseudorandom identifiers as temp lists.
They can refuse the query with the same random number or pseudorandom identifier within a certain time. So the attacker can not disturb the normal communication.
In the protocol, the forward security can be ensured because of random / pseudorandom numbers. An attacker cannot obtain tag's identifier replaced by T PID even it correctly guesses the random number T r . So the protocol offers anonymity.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In RFID systems, the performance is another important metric besides the security issue, such that the optimization and balance between security and performance are necessary for RFID systems [22] .
Like most authentication protocols, the protocol needs five phases to complete the whole authentication process. In order to properly evaluate the protocol, we compare it with other related protocols in two aspects: storage requirement and computation load.
In our protocol, each tag stores identifier
and access list R L , while other related cryptographic algorithms(such as KAAP ) need store the secret keys. Access list stores all readers' pseudorandom identifiers. Additionally, the memory consumption on one-way hash function is another concern. Standardized cryptographic hash functions such as SHA-1 are too expensive for use in today's low-cost RFID tags [22] [23] . A potential alternative is the Whirlpool hash function, which has been standardized by ISO/IEC and evaluated by the New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and Encryption (NESSIE) project [24] . Pramstalleret al. [25] present a compact hardware implementation of Whirlpool, which uses an innovative state representation that makes it possible to significantly reduce the required hardware resources [13] .
During the entire round, each reader and each tag performs one random number generation ( RNG) operation. Each tag also performs one cryptographic hash function while each reader performs twice. Like KAAP, we adopt the access lists R L and T L to avoid exhaustive searches in the storage, which reduce the time complexity of search operation. Table 4 shows the performance comparison with other related protocols. Our protocol has the similar storage requirement as protocols [9] [14] and it is more than S-M. There are no exhaustive searches in the protocol like protocols [9] [14], while protocol [13] require at least n searches in the storage. In the storage analysis, keys, random numbers and hash function value are ignored for the sake of simplicity. All the other components are assumed L bits sized. The protocol owns acceptable storage requirement and computation load. From Table 4 , it shows that the protocol requirements fewer complex function invocations for the tag than the other three protocols. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a novel mutual authentication protocol based on one-way hash function is proposed for security protection in RFID-based sensor systems. The protocol adopts mutual authentication mechanism, access lists and random access control mechanism to strengthen security and privacy protection. The design correctness of the protocol is verified by GNY logic using as a formal analysis. According to attack model analysis, the protocol can resist several major attacks. Moreover, the protocol has acceptable storage requirements and computation load based on performance analysis. The protocol has better scalability because it does not need the secret keys. So the protocol is suitable for more large-scale and highreliability application.
